

Educating for a culture of dialogue in religious education

Lecture 1, Thursday, 21.04.2022

Sergio Cicatelli

1. Premise

There can be at least two ways of approaching the theme of education to a culture of dialogue in religious education (IR): asking how to do it and asking why to do it. The first working hypothesis leads to propose possible school examples of a culture of dialogue and has an essentially didactic purpose, but we will not deal with it here. The second hypothesis can in turn be articulated in two perspectives: asking why one should educate to a culture of dialogue and asking why one can do so; in the first case the school's aims are at stake, in the second the very nature of the culture of dialogue is at stake and the discourse can become an epistemological research aimed at the theoretical foundation of dialogue in schools and religions.

It is above all in the latter perspective that we would like to set out the following reflections, attempting to relate three conceptual poles: dialogue, religion and school. A particular significance of each of these will be highlighted in order to construct a possibly unified path which holds all three concepts together within the specific IR, the nature of which will be kept in mind in a basically universal manner, but with a particularly attentive look at the Italian model, which seems to us capable of offering an effective synthesis. Once the theoretical possibility of dialogue has been established, it will be easy to translate this principle into teaching practice.

First of all, it is necessary to assume the ethical value of dialogue as a premise and precondition of any human experience insofar as a choice of openness to the other. Secondly, it must be accepted that such dialogue is practicable not only between people but also between religions or religious experiences. The whole discussion should therefore be placed in the school context, in which the educational dimension emerges, which guides all the reflection, and the consequent category of freedom which, in the context of a particular anthropology, makes it possible to synthesise all the passages as a fundamental postulate of any ethical and educational discourse. The practicability of dialogue, at school and in IR, will finally find its basis in the preconfessional level of religious experience, identified as a concrete ground for meeting and developing an effective and constructive dialogue.

2. What dialogue means

In order to educate to a culture of dialogue, it is necessary to be clear about the nature of dialogue, and therefore it seems useful to dwell above all on a preliminary definition of it.

The first observation from which we can start is that in order to engage in dialogue, there must be at least two people. It is no coincidence that one of the earliest and greatest examples of this privileged condition are the Platonic dialogues, in which Socrates generally discusses with one interlocutor at a time.

The etymology of the word refers us to the Greek noun *diàlogos* and the verb *dialèghesthai*, in which the *lògos* (translatable as word, but also as thought or reason) is the protagonist, passing from one side to the other (*dià*). Among the different meanings that the preposition *dià* can have, we take two in particular: the preposition can indicate the movement that takes place through (*dià*) a space and it can indicate the cause for which (*dià*) something happens. If we adopt this second meaning, we are led to understand dialogue as something that takes place thanks to the word (*lògos*), i.e. a predominantly intellectual activity. In our view, the other meaning is preferable, in which dialogue is a movement of words (and ideas) passing from one interlocutor to another. In the one case, we tend to emphasise the logical-verbal dimension because the focus is on the *lògos* as the main instrument of dialogue; in the other, we emphasise the dynamic dimension of dialogue, which seems more important to us because, if the movement of the word (or reason or thought) is missing, there is no dialogue. In our preferred meaning, dialogue is an essentially ethical action, not just an intellectual one, even if it is obvious that it uses logical-verbal tools. In its ethical value, dialogue becomes an instrument of relationship and thus a facilitator of encounters and a motive for responsibility.¹ Dialogue is the result of a decision, which one intends to pursue indefinitely, that is, until one has exhausted the motives for dialogue itself, assuming this is possible because dialogue can be transformed from a means of establishing an encounter into an end that is pursued for its own sake, for the simple pleasure of dialogue and of realising oneself in dialogue.

Dialogue, then, is not an intellectual act but a moral action, both because it presupposes - as we shall see - a certain anthropology, and because it puts one in relation with the other and disposes one to establish a constructive relationship with him: I want to dialogue because the other constitutes a value for me, otherwise I would not be interested in engaging in dialogue. I want to engage in dialogue because the other person is of value to me, otherwise I would not be interested in engaging in dialogue.

Dialogue is more than communication. In Aristotle's well-known definition, man is a rational animal (*zòon lòn èchon* = animal endowed with reason/word)², but the meaning of the expression is not to be limited to the mere possession of the *lògos*, but rather to the use that man is capable of making of that *lògos*: communicating, that is, establishing relations. More than a rational animal, man is a relational animal, and dialogue is one of the first and principal forms of his being, assuming an anthropological value that will be useful to us in the rest of this exposition.

Dialogue is morally demanding because it is only possible between people who have the same will to meet each other (one cannot dialogue alone) and recognise each other at the same level (they recognise each other's equal dignity). There is no dialogue with someone I consider inferior to me: there can only be one-way communication. Just as I cannot dialogue with my computer or my mobile phone, and if I do it is because I recognise that behind that material instrument there is someone and not just something.³

3. Dialogue between religions

In the perspective outlined above, dialogue is also possible between institutions, since they are in any case an expression of the people they are composed of. In this case, dialogue becomes a political action, indeed true politics only begins where there is a willingness to dialogue or at least to meet.

In this sense, dialogue is also possible between religious institutions, between Churches, between religions, but the basis must be this mutual recognition and not the intention (perhaps

unconscious or undeclared) to assimilate the other, convert him or correct his errors. A true dialogue is aimed at seeking out what is good in the other in order to go together in search of the truth; otherwise it is just a more or less evolved form of communication.

As an example of inter-religious dialogue, the 1986 Assisi meeting is often cited, where John Paul II invited representatives of the main religions to meet for prayer. The sign of dialogue in that case was the simple presence of different faiths in the same place: there was no real confrontation but only a prayer - each in their own way - to witness to a desire for peace and encounter. The objective was not a doctrinal confrontation but prayer in common (which is different from a common prayer). Dialogue was then not an intellectual fact but an action, a simple attitude testified to by having accepted an invitation, by having moved to meet someone, who obviously had value for each of the participants. And that someone was not just John Paul II (it was not a matter of personal courtesy), but also each of the other representatives of the world's religions. In that case, the meaning of dialogue, apart from being open at the same time to a multiplicity of interlocutors, emerged as essentially metaphorical: wanting to reach out to others, regardless of the response of others. For a religion, openness to dialogue should be a natural and proper fact. In the Old Testament, the covenant is God's willingness to go out to meet man. In the Christian logic, the incarnation shows that God intends to establish a dialogue with man and therefore puts himself on his level. Moreover, the Trinity can constitute an example - however atypical - of dialogue within God himself. In other religions, however, the absolute difference between God and man remains, and this perhaps makes dialogue more difficult because it is a dynamic absent from those theological foundations.

But the willingness to dialogue is inherent in every religion, at least because of the common experience of prayer, which is a dialogue between man and God. Prayer is usually thought of as a unidirectional communication from man to God, but God also answers the prayer of the faithful, if only he knows how to listen. If we were to exclude this communicative reciprocity, the very essence of prayer would be nullified (or at least reduced in size).

In more general terms, and not only in the religious sphere, we can say that dialogue has been transformed from an empirical/existential condition (finding oneself talking in two) into an attitude of openness towards the other. To build a dialogue, then, what matters is not finding the right interlocutor but being the right interlocutor, willing to meet others and open up to dialogue.

Dialogue is thus confirmed as an ethical task. And as such it can and must be the goal of an educational process. We can therefore shift our gaze to schools, to see whether and how a culture of dialogue is situated within them.

4. The nature of school

Schools should by their very nature be places of dialogue, as they are opportunities for different people and cultures to meet. It is not necessary to imagine school classes with pupils coming from different parts of the world, speaking different languages and practising different religions. Even a class made up of pupils from the same culture is in reality a meeting place for cultures, because each pupil is the bearer of his or her own family culture, personal sensitivities and values not always shared by all.

The school is also a place where cultures meet, at least because it is the place where adult culture is confronted with youth or children's culture. The school's task is to gradually introduce them to a cultural system, to a language, to a set of rules, which the pupils will also contribute - often imperceptibly - to modify, simply because they exist and interact with the adults who have the task of educating them.

In school, however, if we think about the premises just developed, the relationship does not seem to favour a true dialogue because the relationship is substantially asymmetrical: one-to-many (teacher-pupils), with the teacher being in a position of power as the possessor of something to transfer to the pupils. Moreover, by virtue of the fact that it constitutes a form of community (at least insofar as it is made up of a number of people), school is in any case a potential opportunity for dialogue: the teacher expects to receive answers from the pupils and thus to initiate a dialogue with them; the pupils certainly have questions to ask the teacher and would like to initiate a dialogue with him in their turn; but above all, pupils at school meet their peers and can have endless opportunities for dialogue among peers, favoured by the context of common research and growth.

Moreover, precisely because the school's task is not only to transmit instrumental knowledge (reading, writing and numerical calculations), for which one-way communication would seem sufficient, but also to educate in common values, a culture of dialogue can grow within it, which each pupil can then practice with different interlocutors. The opposite - a school, that is, that seeks to teach not to dialogue - seems practically impossible: even in a totalitarian society that aspires only to indoctrinate the younger generations, teachers will have to find a way of entering into a relationship with their pupils, not being able to rely solely on the effectiveness of force or imposition.

What is at stake here is the very concept of the school as an institution dedicated to education or instruction.⁴ It would be appropriate at this point to pause for a moment and discuss the concepts of education and instruction, but we must necessarily content ourselves with just a brief outline: education is aimed at the formation of the person as a whole (it is a system, a *Bildung*, a *paideia*); instruction aims from time to time at a single part of the person (learning a language, a system of calculation, a particular discipline). Above all, however, one has to ask whether the two concepts - education and instruction - are really alternatives or not rather complementary: it seems difficult to educate without materially teaching anything in particular, just as it seems impossible to teach something in a completely aseptic way without involving the person in a process of overall growth. In other words, it has to be admitted that it is impossible not to educate and that therefore the school is, inevitably and sometimes regardless of its intentions, an educational institution, with all the aporias that this entails.⁵

The object of educational intentionality is the implicit curriculum, i.e. the set of undeclared conditions of doing school, which in reality define the school much more than the explicit curricular contents: respect for rules, contact with others, recognition of an authority, the value of knowledge and culture, etc. In this context the object of educational intentionality is above all values, which can hardly be the result of a mere educational process. In this context, the object of educational intentions is above all values, which can hardly be the result of a process of mere education: if it were enough to explain what honesty is in order to have honest citizens, we would have solved many problems long ago.

Education, i.e. the complex and uncertain growth of the person, entrusted also and above all to his or her free will, is one of the inevitable actions of the school. And education in values is one of the tasks that schools take on precisely because they must encourage the new generations to enter a cultural system made up not only of material objects but also of principles, rules, judgements and attitudes. These values include dialogue, not so much as a rhetorical exercise (some, at least in Italy, call it debate and think of proposing it as a teaching activity) but as a personal attitude to be promoted and developed in the interest of all, i.e. for the common good.

If the school is to be a part of society and adult life, it must necessarily promote pro-social attitudes, among which dialogue finds its right and proper place. The presence of religion in school curricula must be read in the same vein, as an instrument of inculturation, personal formation and socialisation: neither indoctrination, nor mere information on the

contents of one or more religions. It is worth noting in this regard that the European agency Eurydice surveys the ethical-moral-religious dimension (Religion/Ethics/Moral Education) in European school systems, noting its presence in almost all countries. Beyond the numbers, what is of interest is the criterion for aggregating the subject: ethics and religion, i.e. the area of values and relationships.⁶ The attention paid to this dimension is confirmed by the presence of civic (or citizenship) education in almost all European school systems.⁷

5. The nature of religion

For a dialogue between persons, we have just said that it is necessary to adopt a concept of person as a subject capable of entering into relations with others. For a dialogue between religions, we need to establish just as clearly the nature of religion, but it is not possible here to deal with such a demanding subject. On the other hand, we cannot even be satisfied with saying that religions can dialogue with each other because they are formed by people who are themselves capable of dialogue.

First of all, it seems obvious that we must necessarily speak of religions in the plural, not least because otherwise there would be no reason for dialogue. Religious pluralism does not serve to set the discourse in relativistic terms, but to recognise an inescapable fact, namely the legitimate existence of several religions, all equally convinced of possessing the truth and all equally obliged to recognise each other.

Beyond the differences in the answers they give to man's ultimate questions, it is precisely these questions that constitute the common ground and the possible meeting point of the different religions. If the answers are different, the questions are the same. And this human capacity for questioning can be read as a pre-confessional, or even pre-religious, dimension, in which it is the nature of the question that prompts us to meet in order to seek the answer together.

This condition gives rise first of all to religious communities, which confront each other internally to define the best and most complete doctrinal structure of their own faith (to establish a common *sensus fidei*)⁸, but it also gives rise to dialogue between different religious communities, not in order to search together for a truth that each one already believes to possess, but to nourish themselves with that common religiosity, which we can consider a sort of anthropological universal, the premise of any religious discourse.⁹ In the Gospels, Jesus repeatedly reminds us that we must know how to use our ears to listen: they are the precondition for any evangelisation and any religious discourse. Only after having listened can we give our assent to the message received; out of metaphor, the ears are the preconfessional ground, the preliminary willingness to listen, which is an ethical choice as well as a physiological condition.

On the basis of these considerations, we can continue our discussion, confronting the fairly obvious fact that religions are a strongly identity-based phenomenon, constitutive of a person and foundational of a community. This opens up two possible scenarios: either a conflict or a dialogue between the different identities. Conflict does not interest us here, both because it would take us away from the object of our discourse (dialogue), and because it would entail the "victory" of only one side and thus the annulment of the plural premise from which we started.

It is indisputable that in the past the confrontation between religions was set up in terms of conflict (just think of the many wars of religion that have been fought), but today it seems that we can and must set up the confrontation in terms of dialogue, taking as a common reference point precisely the preconfessional ground of openness to the sacred. But, before that, the foundation of dialogue is the anthropology of reference, which in an ethically connoted field such as the one we are discussing can undoubtedly be based on the

category of freedom, of which we must limit ourselves to considering only the religious applications. Religious freedom is the main freedom that every man must claim for himself and for others, and this guarantees every religion an identical starting point, based on a category essential to the definition of man: there is no man if he is not free and there is no freedom if it is not shared by all.

Here the Council's lesson of *Dignitatis humanae* clearly emerges, which at least for the Catholic Church today constitutes the starting point for any inter-religious confrontation or dialogue. It is true that "we believe that the one true religion subsists in the Catholic and Apostolic Church" (DH, 1), but it is also true that "truth is imposed only by the force of truth itself" (*ibid.*). The religious truth we are talking about is not only an intellectual truth, a datum of experience or reason, but an anthropological truth, aimed at human fulfilment.

Jesus' affirmation "you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free" (Jn 8:32) falls into place in this regard: if freedom is constitutive of man and the truth makes it possible to be free, the search for truth (religious and otherwise) is a condition for the development of our humanity in an ethical sense. On this point, the lesson of the Council can be useful: "The truth, however, is to be sought in a way which corresponds to the dignity of the human person and to his social nature: that is to say, by a search conducted freely, with the help of teaching or education, by means of exchange and dialogue whereby, with the aim of helping one another in the search, one reveals to the other the truth which he has discovered or which he believes he has discovered" (DH, 3).

In such a perspective, religions can all equally claim to aspire to the truth and meet in order to discover ever new aspects of the truth, since, at least as far as the Catholic faithful are concerned, "the Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions" (NAe, 2), provided - precisely - that it is true and holy.

6. School religious education

These can be the premises of a school Religious Education, which, on the basis of what has been said above, is not merely religious instruction but true religious education: not education as catechesis (because some fundamental premises would be missing), but education as the attribution of meaning to the contents which are proposed and which can only be the object of free adhesion.

At this point it is inevitable to refer to the Italian model of IR. This has its legal basis in the 1984 Concordat between Italy and the Holy See, in which it is significant that the ecclesiastical party states in the preamble that it has in mind "the declarations of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council on religious freedom and relations between the Church and the political community, as well as the new codification of canon law" (Preamble). The Italian concordat IR is therefore based, in order, on *Dignitatis humanae* and *Gaudium et Spes*. In particular, on the subject of IR, art. 9.2 of the Italian Concordat states that this teaching is to be placed "within the framework of the school's aims". And it is significant that there is no mention of the Church's purpose or the State's purpose, which could be different or irreconcilable with each other. The school's aims are autonomous from any order, because the school must have at the centre of its action solely the good of each pupil. Once the school's aims have been identified, the IR must also be adapted to them.

At least in the Italian legal system, the main purpose of the school is the full formation of the person.¹⁰ Several legal texts confirm this, but the principle can be generalised at a global level because even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that "education shall be directed towards the full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (art. 26). These

fundamental freedoms include freedom of religion and "this right shall include freedom to change religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest one's religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance" (Art. 18).

The Italian concordat clause of an IR bound to the purposes of the school therefore seems universalisable as it is supported by common sense and international legislation. This not only excludes any form of proselytism through school teaching but also imposes a correct attribution of meaning to the contents of any teaching, which are always only a means (for the full development of the person) and never an end to which the person must submit. Like the other disciplines, religion taught at school therefore becomes an instrument of personal growth, absolutely respectful of the freedom of each pupil (which is a condition of his personal religious position) and open to the contributions that any other knowledge, honestly aimed at the search for truth, will be able to offer (as a consequence of the attitude of dialogue that must be proper to religion).

7. Religious education and inter-religious dialogue

Such an IR must necessarily be open to dialogue, not as an eventual possibility but as an intrinsic condition of the exercise of religion itself. In fact, it would not be an authentic religion if it refused dialogue with other religions. The principle that must guide us in this case is that religion is for man and not man for religion.

A scholastically and scientifically correct teaching of a religion must take into account the existence of other religions and must therefore initiate a constructive confrontation with them, in an attitude of dialogue and not conflictual confrontation.

The Italian model is a valid example of this, since the current teaching indications (school programmes) are very open to inter-religious confrontation: Religious pluralism appears at least 13 times in the first cycle, immediately after cultural-historical (wirkungsgeschichtlich) and biblical themes, on a par with the Church and before God and Jesus; a similar situation occurs in the second cycle, where religious pluralism appears in fourth place in a possible ranking of the most frequent themes, after the Bible, the history of effects (Wirkungsgeschichte) and morals. A glance at the textbooks also confirms this openness, bearing in mind that among the criteria for approving the books themselves by the Italian Bishops' Conference is the presence of adequate space for ecumenism.

In short, the Italian IR model is a model of open confessionality: it can only be confessional because it refers only to the Catholic religion, but it is a confessionality that is open to comparison with other religious experiences precisely because of the implementation of the Council principles mentioned above.

If anything, the critical node may be the choice of teaching a particular religion at school and not translating empirical pluralism into an equally plural teaching proposal, offering an overview of the different religions, perhaps in a comparative key. But this solution has a series of contraindications which we can only briefly summarise here:

- one cannot talk about religion without referring to a particular religion, otherwise one would already be making a choice for a syncretistic or "neutral" discourse, which does not in fact correspond to any real religion;
- transforming the IR into a teaching of the history of religions would lead to the loss of the properly religious nature of its contents, which would be observed from the outside without any guarantee of participation and authenticity;
- teaching without confessional roots would not allow any dialogue, because the presupposition of dialogue itself, i.e. the identity of the dialoguers, would be missing, and pupils would not be able to experience religious dialogue but would see it only as a postulate or a pious intention.

Nor would the decision to open schools to several religious courses, each characterised by a different denominational affiliation, be a solution, since the very possibility of dialogue would be lost, because the space for religious discourse in schools would in principle be separated between the different affiliations and therefore closed to dialogue.

In order to engage in dialogue, it is necessary to start from a particular position and from there open up to the other. The problem is which position to start from, i.e. which confession to privilege in the IR.

The Italian case can once again serve as a model. The choice of the Catholic confession is due to an empirical fact: as the 1984 Concordat states, "the principles of Catholicism are part of the historical heritage of the Italian people". For other countries, historical circumstances may be different and suggest different confessional solutions, but referring to the historical and cultural roots of a country seems to be a reasonable criterion, even when the religious scene is divided between two or more confessions. In any case, the need for Europe to understand its Christian roots, whose internal confessional articulations can be an enrichment rather than a difficulty, is indisputable.

8. What does a "school" teaching of religion mean?

What is at stake here is the nature of the school, which must serve to introduce the new generations into the culture of a country (or a continent), which is inevitably imbued with religious principles and values. The important thing is that the study (because this is what one must do at school: study) of religion is done with the categories proper to religion. It is necessary to talk religiously about religion and not be satisfied with historical, philosophical, artistic, literary, psychological, sociological, legal discourses on religion. Every discipline can legitimately take religion as its object of study, but it can and must also be studied *iuxta propria principia*, that is, with the categories of religion, otherwise we would reduce it to something else and lose its authentic meaning.

The presence of an IR in the school curricula is therefore legitimate (and rightful), with the only condition of respecting the school's own aims and methodologies. If the school has to promote the growth of the person, the IR must do so too, avoiding any form of indoctrination. If schools are places where different people and cultures meet, then IR must also be an opportunity for dialogue on the delicate terrain of the deepest personal convictions. A school that avoids offering IR in its curriculum would be failing in one of its fundamental tasks, that of introducing a culture, because it would be proposing an incomplete image of the culture itself, lacking precisely one of its most qualifying and problematic aspects, as if the school were afraid to venture onto too slippery a slope. But in so doing it would not be doing its pupils a good service.

It is inevitable that at this point a school IR should be characterised by a sincere openness to dialogue. It would be in the nature of the school, but it would also be in the nature of religion, which is more about questions than answers; indeed, questions first and then answers. If this order were reversed, one would not understand the genesis of religious experience, which obviously starts with questions and ends with answers.

This is not to say that the revealed nature of the Christian religion (or of other religions) is not respected. The fact that the initiative comes from God does not mean that man must only passively receive revelation. Nor, on the contrary, is there the risk of falling into one of the two dangers denounced several times by Pope Francis, that of Gnosticism and that of neo-Pelagianism:¹¹ on the one hand reducing religion to an intellectual investigation, on the other hand attributing to man all the credit for his own salvation. A teaching that

speaks religiously about religion can avoid these two dangers and ensure a correct search for truth, which, being a continuous search, is no less guided by the light of truth. These can therefore be the prerequisites for a culture of dialogue, which must belong to the school's DNA no less than to the DNA of religions. The path we have tried to build can support this aspiration for an IR that does not end with the presentation of a simple identity but opens up to the contribution that comes from the plural scenario in which we live. We have tried to highlight the ethical meaning of dialogue (in order to dialogue one must presuppose a willingness to dialogue), thus leading dialogue itself back to its anthropological foundations, among which the category of freedom plays a decisive role. IR is, at school, a privileged opportunity to understand the meaning of this dialogue because the content of the discipline is intrinsically open to dialogue and such as to encourage this kind of experience. Given the educational nature of the school and of IR within it, the role of the religious education teacher becomes decisive as a credible representative of this culture of dialogue, to whose training adequate commitment should be devoted.

¹ Possono essere punti di riferimento in proposito per un verso G. Calogero, *Filosofia del dialogo*, Edizioni di Comunità, Milano 1962, e per un altro M. Buber, *Il principio dialogico e altri saggi*, San Paolo, Cinisello Balsamo 1993.

² Aristotele, *Politica*, 1253a 9-10.

³ Si potrebbe aprire qui il discorso sull'intelligenza artificiale, ma non è questa la sede per affrontare l'argomento: teniamolo solo presente come sfondo per arricchire la portata etica dell'impegno dialogico.

⁴ La distinzione non è forse facilmente comprensibile in altre lingue, dato ad esempio l'uso equivoco di *education* in inglese, dove può significare tanto educazione in senso lato quanto istruzione in senso specificamente scolastico.

⁵ Mi permetto di rinviare in proposito al mio *Educazione, scuola e fattore umano. Appunti in margine al paradosso di Böckenförde*, "Orientamenti pedagogici", LIX, n. 3, luglio-agosto-settembre 2012, pp. 435-55.

⁶ Cfr. European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2019. *Recommended Annual Instruction Time in Full-time Compulsory Education in Europe - 2018/19*. Eurydice - Facts and Figures. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

⁷ Cfr. Commissione europea/EACEA/Eurydice, 2017. *Citizenship Education at School in Europe 2017*. Rapporto Eurydice. Lussemburgo: Ufficio delle pubblicazioni dell'Unione europea.

⁸ Cfr. Commissione Teologica Internazionale, *Il sensus fidei nella vita della Chiesa*, 2014.

⁹ È attivo in Italia un gruppo di ricerca sulla religiosità quale categoria comprensiva e multiconfessionale, che ha prodotto finora alcune ricerche empiriche e pubblicazioni: M.T. Moscato - R. Gatti - M. Caputo (eds.), *Crescere tra vecchi e nuovi dei. L'esperienza religiosa in prospettiva multidisciplinare*, Armando, Roma 2012; F. Arici - R. Gabbiadini - M.T. Moscato (eds.), *La risorsa religione e i suoi dinamismi: Studi multidisciplinari in dialogo*, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2014; M.T. Moscato - M. Caputo - R. Gabbiadini - G. Pinelli - A. Porcarelli, *L'esperienza religiosa. Linguaggi, educazione, vissuti*, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2017.

¹⁰ Cfr. S. Ciatelli, *Guida all'insegnamento della religione cattolica. Secondo le nuove Indicazioni*, La Scuola, Brescia 2015, pp. 19-24.

¹¹ Cfr. Papa Francesco, Esortazione apostolica *Evangelii gaudium*, 24 novembre 2013, n. 94.